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Abstract:)This article demonstrates the value of studying interactions in transnational business 
governance (TBG) and proposes an analytical framework for that purpose. The number of TBG 
schemes involving non-state authority to govern business conduct across borders has vastly 
expanded in a wide range of issue areas. As TBG initiatives proliferate, they increasingly interact 
with one another, and with state-based and other normative regimes. The key challenge is to 
understand the implications of TBG interactions for regulatory capacity and performance – the 
most fruitful initial focus – and ultimately for the impacts of regulation on social and 
environmental problems. To gain purchase on these complex issues, the article develops an 
original framework that disaggregates the regulatory process, focusing on the points at which 
interactions may occur and suggesting, for each point, a series of analytical questions that probe 
the key features of TBG interactions. 
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Introduction 
An increasing portion of business regulation emanates not from conventional state and inter-
state institutions but from an array of private sector, civil society, multi-stakeholder and hybrid 
public-private institutions operating in a dynamic, transnational regulatory space.  Accounting 
standards, fair trade labels, forestry certification schemes, labor rights monitoring, transparency 
standards for extractive industries, and many more: transnational business governance (TBG) 
has grown in scope and importance as production, consumption and their impacts have 
globalized and as states reconsider established modes of regulation. Scholars have devoted 
substantial attention to the emergence, forms, legitimacy and effectiveness of individual TBG 
initiatives.  As TBG schemes proliferate, however, it has become clear that they do not operate in 
isolation.  Rather, they interact with one another, and with other normative regimes, state-based 
and non-state, in highly diverse ways.     
Consider two examples. In forestry, industry-based sustainable forestry certification 
schemes have emerged alongside the more NGO-based Forest Stewardship Council (FSC). 
Interactions between the FSC and its industry-based alternatives are often competitive (e.g. 
Meidinger 1999; Cashore et al. 2004; Overdevest 2010), but they also exhibit considerable 
coordination and institutional mimicry (Gulbrandsen 2010; Fransen 2012). Moreover, while all 
these schemes have long interacted with state regulation in various ways (Meidinger 2001), new 
interactive possibilities have been created by recent European and American legislation requiring 
that all imported wood products must have been harvested legally in their source countries. 
Three papers in this special issue explore these possibilities (Bartley; Cashore & Stone; 
Overdevest & Zeitlin).  
Food safety regulation involves a broader set of actors organized around diverse market 
chains and playing highly differentiated and intertwined roles. Iizuka and Borbon-Galvez (2009) 
describe a complex interactive system in which Latin American food safety standards are 
formulated by varied transnational non-state organizations, adopted by diverse state agencies, 
and implemented by combinations of local government officials and businesses (Meidinger 
2009).  Governance is thus performed by a wide range of actors, each constantly taking account 
of the others’ activities.  
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Transnational business governance interactions (TBGI) are ripe for systematic attention.  
By “interactions” we mean the myriad ways in which governance actors and institutions2 engage 
with and react to one another. Researchers have begun to examine isolated aspects of the 
phenomenon – for example, interactions between TBG schemes and official legal systems, or 
specific cases of inter-scheme competition or isomorphism. However, our knowledge of these 
interactions, and hence of their role in larger regulatory systems, remains incomplete.  What are 
the drivers, mechanisms and pathways of interaction? What are its outputs, outcomes and 
impacts?  Without addressing such questions, it is impossible to assess the full implications of 
TBG, including whether TBG schemes are racing one another to the top or the bottom and 
whether their interactions reinforce or undermine efforts to achieve regulatory goals such as 
sustainable development. 
We argue that the study of TBG interactions and their effects is a promising research 
program and propose an analytical framework for furthering that program. TBG is characterized 
by heterogeneous actors possessing various regulatory capacities, acting within diverse 
institutional contexts, seeking to influence the allocation and exercise of regulatory authority, 
and performing a range of regulatory tasks throughout the policy cycle, from agenda-setting and 
rule formation to compliance promotion and sanctioning.  This implies a high degree of 
interaction – within and among TBG schemes, and between TBG schemes and state-based 
regulation.  Interactions occur at multiple levels (e.g., of individual actors, TBG schemes or 
entire governance complexes), take many forms (e.g., competition, imitation or steering), have 
varied effects on regulatory outputs, outcomes and impacts, and exhibit temporal dynamics (e.g. 
diffusion, divergence and adaptation).   
Building on these assumptions, we propose an analytical framework to facilitate investigation 
of the drivers, forms, causal mechanisms and pathways of TBGI, and their effects on regulatory 
2 For our purposes, institutions are cognitive and normative structures that facilitate and constrain behaviour. 
Examples include economic and political infrastructures; taken-for-granted social rules of behaviour; and 
international regimes and regime complexes (Ikenberry 1988; Jepperson 1991; Scott 2001; DiMaggio and Powell 
1991; North 1990; Krasner 1982; Raustiala & Victor 2004). We distinguish institutions from actors, which are 
individuals and organizations capable of taking goal-oriented action. While some institutions are largely 
disconnected from organizations, others – and these are the ones we will mainly focus on - are predominantly 
structured around organizations, which embody the larger (institutional) normative and cognitive framework (e.g., 
Hodgson 2006). A key point for present purposes is that both institutions and actors can interact. 
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capacity, performance and outcomes. We do not specify a particular theoretical orientation or 
methodological approach.  We believe that theoretical and methodological diversity is essential 
in dealing with as complex a phenomenon as TBGI.  Our objective is to offer an analytical 
framework that can mobilize a range of theoretical approaches in a shared research program. 
The papers in this special issue advance the TBGI research agenda.  Drawing on rich and 
well-researched empirical contexts, notably forestry governance, natural resource management 
and global finance, these papers collectively make a substantial contribution toward better 
understanding the under-explored phenomenon of TBGI and its role in global governance. The 
article is organized as follows. Section 1 defines TBG (1.1), and TBG interactions (1.2). Section 
2 reviews recent scholarship on TBG (2.1) and TBG interactions (2.2) to extract implications for 
our research program (2.3). Section 3, the core of the article, presents our analytical framework. 
Section 4 concludes briefly. 
1. TBGI:)The)Nature)of)the)Beast)
1.1#Transnational#Business#Governance#
Building on standard accounts of transnational relations (Hale & Held 2011; Keohane & 
Nye 1971; Risse-Kappen 1995), transnational business governance (TBG) refers to systematic 
efforts to regulate business conduct that involve a significant degree of non-state authority in the 
performance of regulatory functions across national borders.  TBG is longstanding in certain 
domains, including accounting (Camfferman & Zeff 2006), electricity (Büthe 2010b), product 
standards (Perry 1955) and kosher food (Starobin & Weinthal 2010).  Since World War II, 
however, TBG initiatives have expanded to include not just  “technical” (interoperability) 
standards aimed at reducing transaction costs (e.g. ,internet protocols) but also quality standards 
and, increasingly, “regulatory” standards aimed at reducing externalities (Abbott & Snidal 2001).  
These range from food safety risks (consumption externalities) to worker safety and 
environmental harms (production externalities). As their scope has broadened, transnational 
codes of conduct, certification and labeling schemes, reporting mechanisms and the like have 
emerged in ever-increasing numbers.  
The “transnational” in TBG refers to arrangements that cross national borders and involve 
the exercise of a significant degree of authority by non-state actors.  In this regard, “state” 
denotes actors based in the institutions of the state, including (in contrast to the approaches of 
! 
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some scholars) intergovernmental, supra-national and trans-governmental structures.  We focus 
on initiatives in which non-state actors are afforded authority to perform varied regulatory 
functions, alone or together with state-based actors (Meidinger 1997; Cashore 2002; Keck & 
Sikkink 1998; Risse-Kappen 1995; Black 2001; Abbott & Snidal 2009 a, b, 2010).  
“Business” denotes a focus on the regulation of commercial, industrial or professional 
activity in pursuit of socially defined goals.  This includes not just regulation of the ultimate 
targets but also regulation of intermediaries (e.g. financial institutions) capable of influencing 
targets’ behavior, and even meta-regulation of government regulation. Importantly, business 
actors are not just targets of TBG. While regulation is always “co-produced” by regulators and 
targets insofar as the latter must implement regulation within their organizations (Black 2001), in 
TBG firms also exercise authority to perform regulatory functions such as agenda-setting, rule-
making and enforcement.  
Although we speak of “governance,” we focus on “regulatory governance.”  Defined 
broadly, “governance” encompasses all activities performed in conducting the policies or affairs 
of a state, organization, network or society (Held & McGrew 2002; Hunt & Wickham 1994; 
Kooiman 1993; Rosenau & Czempiel 1992; Rosenau 1997).  Like Hale & Held (2011: 12), we 
focus on the subset of governance that involves regulation: organized and sustained attempts to 
change the behavior of targeted actors to address a collective problem or attain a collective end, 
through a combination of rules or norms and means for their implementation and enforcement.  
State and non-state actors may engage in regulation and rules may be “hard” or “soft”.  As the 
term “regulation” is often associated with state-based actions and legal rules, however, we use 
the broader term “regulatory governance” (Levi-Faur 2011). 
1.2#TBG#Interactions#
What makes our research agenda distinctive is its explicit focus on interactions as an object 
of inquiry.  This focus is animated partly by the empirical observation that as TBG schemes 
proliferate, the frequency, intensity and variety of interactions among them, and with state-based 
institutions, increase; and partly by a theoretically-informed expectation that the increasing 
complexity of transnational regulatory governance will produce extensive institutional 
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interactions, some of which may be novel or problematic (Alter & Meunier 2009; Gehring & 
Oberthür 2009).   
TBG schemes take diverse forms and involve heterogeneous actors – from individuals to 
organizations, technical experts to political entrepreneurs, NGOs to business firms to 
government agencies. Pursuing diverse interests, values and beliefs about appropriate forms of 
regulation, these actors engage in complex co-regulatory processes.  TBG schemes engage in 
virtually all of the tasks that constitute regulatory governance, from shaping the regulatory 
agenda to enforcing norms (Black 2002; 2003; Abbott & Snidal 2009a, b).   
As these diverse schemes multiply, they interact with one another and with state-based 
governance.  As noted above, we define “interactions” broadly as including all the ways in which 
TBG actors and institutions engage with and react to one another and state-based regulatory 
actors and institutions.  Interactions may be symmetrical or asymmetrical, antagonistic or 
synergistic, intentional or unintentional. They may even be unnoticed by some actors.  For 
example, where one scheme adopts another’s organizational structure or refers to its rules, the 
latter may engage in a process of mutual adjustment, may choose not to make any adjustment, or 
may even remain wholly unaware of the interaction. Interactions frequently occur among 
schemes within a particular sector or issue-area, but they may also occur across domains, as 
between trade and the environment (Raustiala & Victor 2004; Gehring 2011).   
Competition, sometimes shading into conflict or domination, often occurs in domains 
characterized by multiple schemes driven by actors with differing regulatory goals.  In forestry, 
for example, industry-led certification programs compete for users and legitimacy with the civil 
society-driven FSC – even as all these schemes intersect with state regulation (e.g., legality 
requirements) and international agreements (e.g., international trade law).  Cooperative 
interactions also occur, as in extractive industries, where TBG schemes have converged on 
norms of information disclosure and transparency (Haufler, this issue).  TBG schemes may also 
exhibit a division of labor, as in food safety regulation (Meidinger 2009).  
2.#Current#Scholarship#
Most scholarship on TBG has focused on particular TBG schemes or types of schemes (2.1).  
More recently, scholars have begun to address interactions, applying a wide range of theoretical 
perspectives (2.2).  This research has significant implications for a TBGI research agenda (2.3). 
! 
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2.1#Scholarship#on#TBG#
Much research on TBG has focused on defining the phenomenon, identifying conditions for 
its emergence, and evaluating its legitimacy or effectiveness, rather than on interactions (e.g., 
Cutler et al 1999; Hall & Biersteker 2002; Djelic & Sahlin-Andersson 2006; Dingwerth 2007; 
Graz & Nölke 2008; Vogel 2009; Büthe 2010a).  Most studies examine individual initiatives 
within a domain, or compare initiatives across domains, such as accounting and quality 
management (Tamm Hallström 2004) or sustainable forestry and fishing (Gulbrandsen 2008, 
2010).  Many also focus on particular institutional forms, especially state/non-state partnerships 
(Bäckstrand 2008; Börzel & Risse 2005; Pattberg 2010; Schäferhoff et al. 2009), and 
collaborations among state, business and civil society actors (Abbott & Snidal 2009 a, b; Dilling 
2012). Other scholars focus on firms’ motivations to adopt voluntary TBG norms (e.g., Fransen 
& Burgoon 2012; Potoski & Prakash 2005).  Another important literature addresses the 
legitimation dynamics through which TBG initiatives pursue, acquire or lose regulatory authority 
(e.g., Tamm Hallström 2004; Wood 2005; Bernstein & Cashore 2007; Black 2008; Meidinger 
2008; Quack 2010; Casey & Scott 2011; Richardson & Eberlein 2011).   
Taken together, this research provides important insights into who participates in formulating 
TBG rules; how schemes verify compliance; how certification bodies mediate between standard 
setters and regulatory targets; how schemes seek to legitimize themselves; and the relative roles 
of economic incentives, normative commitment and peer pressure in shaping firms’ adherence 
and compliance.  It does not, however, deal adequately with the complex interactions among 
TBG schemes and with other regulators.  
2.2#Scholarship#on#Interactions#
Scholarly interest in TBGI began, and remains preoccupied, with the relationship between 
TBG schemes and state-based regulation (e.g. Meidinger 2001; Wood 2003; Kingsbury et al. 
2005; Schepel 2005; Trubek & Trubek 2007; Eberlein & Newmann 2008; Wood & Johannson 
2008; Bartley 2011b). More recent research examines TBGI more broadly, from a variety of 
positive and normative perspectives representing nearly the full spectrum of theoretical 
orientations in the social sciences.   
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Rationalist, actor-centered approaches examine the dynamics of TBGI as bargaining between 
rational actors shaped by power. Abbott and Snidal’s (2009a, b) work on state-business-NGO 
interactions in the “governance triangle” is an example.  Related analyses employ rationalist or 
historical institutionalism to examine institutional interactions. Regime and regime complexity 
theory highlights relationships among nested, overlapping and parallel regimes in multiple issue 
areas (Aggarwal 1998; Raustiala & Victor 2004; Helfer 2004). Analyses of institutional 
interaction or “interplay” address institutions’ effects on one another, proposing discrete 
pathways and causal mechanisms to explain interaction effects (Gehring & Oberthür 2008, 2009; 
Oberthür & Stokke 2011).  However, both regime complexity and institutional interaction 
research focus primarily on intergovernmental arrangements and on rule promulgation rather 
than implementation (Alter & Meunier 2009: 13), albeit with exceptions (Abbott 2012; Auld & 
Green 2011; Kelley 2009).  
Other scholars emphasize the significance of legitimation in shaping interactions (e.g., Wood 
2005; Bernstein & Cashore 2007; Black 2008; Fransen 2012; Gulbrandsen, this issue), or employ 
network theory to analyze the inter-organizational and inter-personal aspects of TBGI (e.g., 
Smith & Fischlein 2010; Koppell 2010; Richardson 2009). Still other accounts, rooted in 
sociological new institutionalism, posit that interactions are driven less by conscious strategies 
than by structural forces arising from the relevant organizational fields (e.g., Bartley 2007b; 
Dingwerth & Pattberg 2009). Bartley’s work on labor and environmental standards (2003, 2005, 
2007a, 2011a) examines how these “socially constructed arena(s) of self-referencing, mutually 
dependent organizations” structure and are structured by TBGI (2007a: 231). 
Scholars of law and regulation bring further perspectives to bear on the phenomenon. Perez 
(2011) introduces the concept of “ensemble regulation” to characterize the regulatory formations 
constituted by multiple links and cross-sensitivities among environmental TBG schemes. He 
argues that this ensemble produces positive enforcement and normative externalities even while 
limiting the possibility for radical critique. Bomhoff & Meuwese (2011) apply concepts of meta-
regulation and inter-systemic conflicts to analyze how transnational regulatory initiatives interact 
with other normative orders (compare Parker 2002).  Herberg (2008) uses the concept of 
“interlegality” (Santos 2002) to characterize interactions, bringing the ideational and cultural 
dimensions of TBG to the fore. Other scholarship in this vein emphasizes that interactions can 
! 
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take place through symbols, concepts and discourses, for example by defining and redefining 
“master metaphors” such as sustainability, ecosystem and health (Meidinger 1999).  
Another important line of research concerns the outcomes of interactions and their 
implications for regulatory effectiveness (Bernauer 1995; Underdal & Young 2004). There is no 
consensus whether interactions are predominantly competitive or collaborative.  A few analysts 
argue that the predominant pattern is simultaneous cooperation and competition, or “co-
opetition” (e.g., Koppell 2010). Others emphasize competition but disagree whether it leads to a 
race to the bottom or top in terms of outcomes. For Cashore et al. (2004: 5), the answer varies 
with domestic industry structure, while Overdevest (2004, 2010) argues that public pressure has 
ratcheted-up transnational forestry standards via regulatory competition. Smith and Fischlein 
(2010) argue that while competition among rival governance networks induces rule convergence, 
it also promotes continuing rule innovation and creative solutions to social problems. Meidinger 
(2008) speculates that competition for acceptance might create pressure to adopt standards that 
respond to or even anticipate public demands, leading TBG schemes toward more transparent, 
participatory processes and more ambitious and effective rules.   
Others are more pessimistic. Fransen (2011, 2012) and Gulbrandsen (2005, 2010) argue that 
upward convergence is largely superficial, masking substantial divergence in standards and 
performance.  The regime complexity literature emphasizes – excessively, in Overdevest and 
Zeitlin’s view (this issue) – negative consequences of interaction, including duplication, lack of 
coordination, conflicts arising from rule inconsistencies, and cross-institutional strategic 
behaviour such as forum-shopping and regime-shifting (Alter & Meunier 2009, Raustiala & 
Victor 2004; Helfer 2004).    
A growing literature explores how interactions may be “steered” to promote desired 
outcomes. Braithwaite and Drahos (2000) use Latour’s (1986) notion of “enrollment” to describe 
the construction of TBG regimes.  Black (2002, 2003) combines the concepts of enrollment and 
regulatory capacity to analyze interactions within the transnational financial regime.  Wood 
(2003, 2005) employs a governmentality framework to examine steering as a mode of interaction 
in the field of environmental management.  Abbott and Snidal (2009a, 2010; Abbott et al. 2011; 
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Abbott 2012) explore ways in which governance actors might “orchestrate” TBG interactions to 
improve regulatory performance.   
Others argue that experimentalist processes of benchmarking and learning can promote 
desired outcomes (Overdevest & Zeitlin, this issue). Calliess and Zumbansen (2010) suggest a 
decentralized steering dynamic in which state, non-state and hybrid regulators seek to identify an 
evolving “rough consensus” in light of which they put forward experimental regulatory schemes, 
which in turn constitute a “running code” that adapts in response to ongoing feedback. This 
process involves constant cross-fertilization, co-evolution, competition and other “intricate 
collision[s]” among governance schemes (Zumbansen 2011: 69).   
2.3)Implications)for)a)TBGI)Research)Program)
While undoubtedly incomplete, this survey confirms that studying TBGI is a “most 
promising research programme” (Herberg 2008: 20).  A diverse body of TBGI scholarship is 
emerging, yet we still “know too little about these interplays to know what configurations are 
stable or potent,” or how multiple regulatory forms co-evolve, hybridize, compete, and reshape 
organizational behavior (Schneiberg & Bartley 2008: 51-52).  
Exploring TBG interactions poses several analytical challenges.  First, interactions take 
place, and can be studied, at multiple levels of analysis:  the “micro” level of individuals and 
organizations, which interact to constitute and govern TBG schemes; the “meso” level of TBG 
schemes, which interact with one other and with state-based institutions; and the “macro” level 
of regulatory complexes. Similarly, units of analysis can vary from specific dyadic interactions 
(Gehring & Oberthür 2009) to larger patterns of interaction within hybrid public-private regime 
complexes (Abbott 2012). 
Second, analysts must choose whether to study interactions as outcomes or as factors 
producing effects. In the former case, they would ask what drives and shapes interactions; in the 
latter, what effects interactions have on TBG schemes, regulatory complexes, and regulatory 
outputs, outcomes and impacts. Either way, they should identify the mechanisms and pathways 
through which both kinds of influences operate (Hedström & Swedberg 1998).   
Third, interactions are dynamic and must be analyzed as such.  The nature and patterns of 
interactions of a scheme in the early days of its inception and stabilization may be distinctly 
! 
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different from those which characterize it once it is firmly institutionalized.  The entry of new 
players can also introduce new patterns of interactions.   
A fourth challenge arises from the diversity of theoretical and methodological approaches to 
TBGI. As suggested above, analysts may draw predominantly on rationalist accounts, analyzing 
TBG interactions as encounters among rational actors with particular interests; they may draw on 
structuralist approaches, emphasizing the significance of system-level properties in shaping 
interactions; or they may seek to transcend the agency/structure divide. No single approach will 
be capable of dealing with the full complexity of these phenomena; there is no one “best” theory.   
How then to address these challenges?  In the next section, we propose an overarching 
analytical framework that disaggregates TBGI into several components, indicates how they relate 
to one another, and accommodates a range of theoretical approaches. 
 
3.#TBG#Interactions:#A#Framework#for#Analysis#
As we have emphasized, TBG is a dynamic, co-regulatory and co-evolutionary process, 
involving state, non-state and hybrid actors and organizations, which interact at multiple levels 
and in multiple ways with a range of effects. These actors and organizations pursue varied 
interests, values and goals, and possess differential regulatory capacities: varied endowments of 
resources relevant to performing particular regulatory functions.  These include, notably, 
financial resources, organizational capacity, expertise, authority and legitimacy, and strategic 
position, all of which actors use to further regulatory projects they support (Black 2002, 2003; 
Abbott & Snidal 2009a).   
As noted in Part 1, regulatory governance requires the performance of a range of functions or 
roles: (1) framing the regulatory agenda and setting objectives; (2) formulating rules; (3) 
implementing rules within the targets of regulation; (4) gathering information and monitoring 
behavior; and (5) responding to non-compliance via sanctions and other forms of enforcement 
(Black 2002; 2003; Abbott & Snidal 2009a).  Each of these can be performed by different actors, 
and different resources are useful for each.  For example, legitimacy based on representativeness 
or sound governance processes may be important for organizations formulating rules, but 
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technical expertise may be more important for organizations engaged in monitoring or 
information gathering.  Strategic position is critical for those trying to change target actors’ 
behavior, but may be unnecessary if an organization can enroll or orchestrate others to act on its 
behalf (Black 2002, 2003; Abbott & Snidal 2009b; Abbott et al. 2011).  
Analysis of TBG interactions should take regulatory governance as its starting point. 
Scholars should first identify the points in the regulatory process at which interactions occur, and 
should then address six central questions for each such point: (1) who or what is interacting; (2) 
what drives and shapes interaction; (3) what are the mechanisms and pathways of interaction; (4) 
what is the character of interaction; (5) what are the effects of interaction; and (6) how do 
interactions change over time?  These questions are not exhaustive, and no single study needs to 
address all of them.  In our view, however, they isolate the key dimensions of the phenomenon.  
Together with the aforementioned components of regulatory governance, they provide the 
skeleton of our analytical framework, shown in matrix form in Table 1.  
! 
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 Component of regulatory governance 
Dimension of 
interaction 
Goal/agenda 
setting  
Rule formation Implementation Monitoring, 
information 
gathering 
Compliance 
promotion, 
enforcement 
Who or what 
interacts 
     
Drivers and 
shapers 
     
Mechanisms and 
pathways  
     
Character of 
interaction 
     
Effects of 
interaction 
     
Change over 
time 
     
 
 
This framework accommodates the diversity of actors and organizations involved in TBG, 
the multiplicity of drivers, pathways and mechanisms of interaction, the co-evolutionary 
interplay between agents’ actions and systemic properties constituting different interaction 
characters and effects, and the dynamic nature of interactions.  Not every study of TBGI will 
investigate all elements of the framework. Researchers may focus on some variables while 
bracketing others. The purpose of this article is to provide a framework within which they can 
make such choices without losing sight of the whole. 
3.1#Who#or#what#is#interacting?#
We have already highlighted the heterogeneity of actors involved in TBG.  These actors 
perform different regulatory roles at different points in the regulatory process, sometimes 
performing multiple roles simultaneously. TBG interactions thus involve numerous actor 
combinations, and these must be specified in any analysis.  Analysts may need to disaggregate 
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generic categories of business, state, and civil society to distinguish between, for example, 
retailers and primary producers; transnational corporations and small businesses; targets of 
regulation and firms providing services to targets (e.g., auditors); consumer, human rights, 
environmental and labour NGOs; actors from the global “North” and “South”; or sub-national, 
national and international governmental organizations. Frequently, TBG schemes establish their 
own actor categories, which might be useful for analytical purposes. 
As noted in Part 2.3, studying TBGI poses a challenge in terms of levels and units of 
analysis.  This challenge is complicated by the fact that numerous TBG schemes, and many of 
the organizations that participate in them, are organizations of organizations and thus not simply 
actors but also arenas where interaction occurs. Furthermore, TBG schemes often participate in 
rule formation or as rule addressees in other TBG schemes.  For example, the FSC and other 
major TBG schemes are members of the ISEAL Alliance, a meta-regulatory initiative that sets 
standards for social and environmental standards-setters, while the Global Reporting Initiative 
(GRI) and other TBG schemes participated in the development of the ISO 26000 social 
responsibility guide.  
To render this complexity tractable, we distinguish three levels of analysis.  Micro-level 
approaches address interactions among individuals and organizations, such as firms and NGOs, 
to create and govern TBG schemes.  Such an approach might, for example, examine interactions 
within a single scheme – among the actors formulating standards, conducting certifications, and 
being certified.  Meso- level analysis addresses TBG schemes’ interactions with each other and 
with state-based institutions, often within an organizational field. Such an approach might, for 
example, examine interactions among particular schemes operating within one industry sector 
but addressing different issues or involving different actors (e.g. legality and sustainability in 
forestry, Bartley, Cashore & Stone, and Overdevest & Zeitlin, this issue; or conflict and 
corruption in mining, Haufler, this issue).  Finally, macro or systemic analyses address entire 
regulatory complexes.  Such an approach might examine how a complex constituted by 
organizational fields, norms and discourses within one domain (e.g., labor rights) intersects with 
other complexes in different domains (e.g., international trade). 
At this early stage in TBGI research, there is value in focusing on the middle, “meso-” level.  
This level of analysis provides sufficient abstraction to identify patterns and trends, without 
! 
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sacrificing empirical detail. It recognizes that TBG schemes are arenas in which individuals, 
firms, NGOs and other agents interact; and that they operate within larger regulatory complexes.  
Yet it views these relationships from a vantage point that treats TBG schemes themselves as 
interacting entities. 
We can distinguish further between “horizontal” and “vertical” analyses. A horizontal 
analysis at this level might examine interactions among TBG schemes, such as institutional 
isomorphism or competition for users.  A vertical analysis might examine interactions between a 
TBG scheme and its constituent actors, or between a TBG scheme and a larger regulatory 
complex. It might inquire into either “upward” processes of interest aggregation and rule 
formation, or “downward” processes such as the influence of collective norms on actors’ 
perceptions, decisions or behavior.   
Finally, as to units of analysis, approaches that conceptualize interactions in purely dyadic 
terms, such as “target/source” (Gehring & Oberthür 2009) or “principal/agent,” while shedding 
light on relationships and influences, will not capture fully the proliferation of actors and 
initiatives and their multiple, often-changing interactions.  Further, as TBG schemes are unlikely 
to emerge in previously ungoverned domains (Bartley 2011b), they will typically have to 
navigate around existing initiatives, particularly national legal regimes, although they may seek 
to change those systems to accommodate their own norms (e.g., the International Swaps and 
Derivatives Association and national bankruptcy laws, Biggins & Scott 2011).  Thus, approaches 
that emphasize polycentricity and hybridity are likely to be particularly fruitful. 
3.2#What#drives#and#shapes#interactions?##
The second element of our framework focuses on the factors that drive and shape 
interactions. One possible driver is the structure of the governance problem. Coordination 
problems generate different interaction possibilities than do collaboration scenarios. The latter 
generate multiple competitive or cooperative possibilities depending on their payoff structures 
and the likelihood of future interactions.  Free-rider incentives, externalities and other 
characteristics of public goods and common pool resources make their governance vulnerable to 
competition and conflict, inhibiting cooperation. Transaction costs can also inhibit cooperation. 
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Complex global problems like climate change create different possibilities and challenges for 
interaction than localized problems like freshwater pollution.   In addition, Haufler (this issue) 
shows that physical features such as the geographic distribution of natural resources may play a 
role in shaping interactions. 
Other drivers operate at the actor level.  These include actors’ interests, values, perceptions, 
knowledge and resources.  Alignment of interests and values is a powerful enabler of 
cooperation, as misalignment is of conflict. Asymmetrical distribution of information and 
resources also influences the likelihood and character of interaction. System-level drivers include 
the proliferation and density of governance organizations in particular issue areas: the greater the 
number, the greater the likelihood of interaction.  More important than sheer numbers, however, 
is the degree of overlap and consistency.  Schemes may overlap – and exhibit consistency or 
inconsistency – in members, rules, issue focus, rule addressees, regulatory functions, etc.  One 
scheme’s actions may influence others’ strategic choices. As noted earlier, the institutional 
interplay and regime complexity literatures tend to emphasize destructive interactions, whereas 
experimentalist and legal pluralist scholarship suggests that overlap and inconsistency can be 
productive.   
Industry characteristics are also important drivers.  Ownership concentration, value chain 
integration, average firm size, vulnerability to reputational pressures, maturity of the market and 
other features can promote different forms of interaction (Cashore et al. 2004).  The “market for 
regulation” is also significant, including the number of would-be regulators and the maturity of 
regulation.  If well established governance institutions operate in stable regulatory markets, 
governance interactions are likely to be limited.  
Interactions are also conditioned by social, economic, technological and political structures 
(Callon 1998; Law & Hassard 1999).  TBG interactions can be shaped by functional 
interdependencies created by technological structures, as in global financial markets (Porter, this 
issue).  Interactions are also shaped by social networks, lasting patterns of relationships that 
serve as channels for the transfer of material or symbolic resources (Thompson 2003).  
Braithwaite and Drahos (2000) highlight the role of professional networks, particularly “model 
mongers” and “model mercenaries,” in explaining the gradual homogenization of many global 
business regulation regimes. 
! 
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Finally, cultures, discourses, mentalities, epistemic communities, and other ideational factors 
can condition the possibilities for and character of interaction. Regulatory problems are socially 
constructed, and thus themselves the product of interactions (Wood 2005). Forest governance 
interactions, for example, focus partly on defining the nature of the forest sustainability problem 
as a condition for creating and legitimating a governance solution. Such interactions are 
influenced by shared understandings of proper forest management, sustainability and community 
stability. Importantly, taken-for-granted concepts can shape TBGI while masking power 
structures.  Governance problems and regulatory solutions are often shaped by dominant 
discourses of “sustainable development,” “free markets” and so on, which in turn may favor and 
be shaped by powerful business actors (Levy & Newell 2002; Fuchs & Kalfaggiani 2010).   
3.3.#What#are#the#mechanisms#and#pathways#of#interaction?#
Rather than simply suggesting that certain factors lead to certain results, analysis of TBGI 
should explore the mechanisms and pathways through which such influences operate (Hedström 
& Swedberg 1998; Abbott & Snidal, forthcoming). Mechanisms for facilitating and shaping 
interaction include organizations (Williamson 1985; Reed 2003), markets (e.g. North, 1990), 
networks (e.g. Thompson 2003) and communities (Djelic and Quack 2010), each with its own 
social logics. It is worth noting the importance of “sites” of interactions: which mechanisms and 
pathways are available is shaped by the specific sites of interaction, i.e. the institutional settings 
in which interactions take place.  Overlapping membership structures are a common 
organizational mechanism by which interactions are shaped in regime complexes. Relational ties 
within networks can likewise operate to channel resources, ideas and norms, thus shaping 
interactions (True & Mintrom 2001). Epistemic communities provide another pathway for 
facilitating and mediating inter-scheme interactions (Haas 1992; Braithwaite & Drahos 2000).   
Interactive mechanisms and pathways can operate at different points in the regulatory 
governance process.  Organizational cross-memberships and social networks may be particularly 
influential in framing regulatory agendas, designing standard-setting procedures or determining 
the core elements of TBG schemes (e.g., standards, labeling and certification). Gehring and 
Oberthür (2009) also identify mechanisms that operate at the level of regulatory outcomes and 
on-the-ground impacts. 
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Interactions may be effected through direct communication, with individuals or organizations 
acting as norm entrepreneurs; or indirectly, through cognitive interactions such as mimicry and 
policy learning, in which observation and interpretation, rather than interpersonal 
communication, are the central mechanisms. Cognitive interaction occurs when information, 
knowledge or ideas produced in one institution modify the perceptions of relevant decision-
makers in another (Gehring & Oberthür 2009). An important aspect of interaction among TBG 
schemes is thus the information such schemes produce: for example, analyzing problems, 
monitoring and publicizing performance, and communicating views on proper governance.  
Indeed, gathering and disseminating information may be among the most important mechanisms 
of TBG interaction.   TBG schemes may use evidence from state-based or other TBG schemes in 
defining and performing their own roles and functions, or in pushing issues onto policy agendas, 
mollifying group pressure, searching for optimum policy solutions, or creating legitimacy (Rose 
1993; Bennett 1991; Bennett & Howlett 1992; Dolowitz & Marsh 2000).   
A range of intermediating actors, including NGOs, consulting firms and certification bodies, 
act as pathways of interaction in policy diffusion processes.  These actors select and interpret 
evidence from other schemes in the same or different domains, adapting it to their ends and 
circumstances.  In Dorf and Sabel’s (1998) experimentalist governance model, TBG schemes 
might be designed, or perceived, as governance experiments; a meta-level overseer evaluates 
their performance, taking the best ideas from each experiment to create new governance systems 
(Overdevest & Zeitlin, this issue). 
One important potential set of mechanisms and pathways that is overlooked in the TBG 
literature consists of the tools and techniques of regulatory governance. Meta-regulatory 
standards for TBG standards-setting, auditing, accreditation or certification, promulgated by such 
meta-organizations as the ISEAL Alliance, ISO and the WTO, are one example.  These meta-
regulatory standards can be important mechanisms of interaction.   
Another example is provided by co-regulatory and other enrollment devices by which state 
and non-state organizations are harnessed to produce hybrid governance regimes (Abbott & 
Snidal 2009b, 2010; Black 2002; Scott 2004). As the “new governance” literature emphasizes, 
enrollment occurs at multiple stages of the regulatory process.  At the rule-formation stage, a 
regulator can adopt the standards of another scheme; for example, the EU has adopted IASB 
! 
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accounting rules; the fair trade codes reference ILO rules; and many state regulations incorporate 
ISO and Codex standards.  One common mechanism of rule interaction is conditional rule 
referencing: “if you comply with X’s rule, that will constitute compliance with my regulation.”  
Such conditional rule referencing can produce myriad interactions.  Importantly, the scheme 
whose rules are being adopted may be unaware of the enrollment, far less having consented to it.  
Review and accountability procedures, including peer review, are important elements of 
monitoring in the regulatory process and thus operate as mechanism of interaction.   
Regulatory strategies such as these can thus structure interactions among numerous TBG 
schemes, contributing to the creation of multi-layered regulatory complexes (e.g., Cashore & 
Stone, this issue; Perez 2011).  National laws that stipulate compliance with TBG standards, for 
example, produce not only interactions between national regulators and a TBG scheme (Gehring 
& Oberthür 2009; Meidinger 2009; Scott 2004; Black, 2002), but also functional 
interdependencies which can enhance the capacity of each participant: the TBG scheme gains the 
state’s enforcement capacity; the state gains the norm-generating capacity of the scheme; and 
each gains the symbolic resources of the other.    
Interactions can also occur at the level of regulatory implementation, through the mechanism 
of the supply chain.  For example, a supplier may face demands from different buyers to conform 
to multiple schemes, and so may adopt the most demanding one for all its operations, displacing 
the others in practice.  Alternatively, the mechanism for interaction may be legal requirements 
for firms to comply with multiple state or TBG standards, which conflict or produce adverse 
outcomes in combination.  For example banks operating in the EU must comply with the rules of 
the IASB and the Basle Committee on Banking Supervision; in the 2008 financial crisis this 
double requirement created a vicious cycle, significantly worsening the crisis (Black 2012).  
Such interactions may then prompt interactions between standard-setters, either vertically (e.g., if 
politicians become involved) or horizontally between schemes (in this case, the Basle Committee 
urged IASB to change its rules).   
As Abbott & Snidal (forthcoming) note, mechanisms and pathways are often complex and 
intertwined, requiring the development of stylized facts so that descriptive detail does not 
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obscure analytical insight; yet they allow analysts to move beyond conjecture about the 
implications of TBGI to produce clear, generalizable accounts of the genesis of interactions and 
the link between interactions and regulatory outcomes.  They represent one of the most 
promising avenues to gain analytical purchase on the complex phenomenon of TBGI. 
3.4.#What#is#the#character#of#interaction?#
As noted earlier, most scholars emphasize the competitive nature of TBG interactions. Yet 
this is only one of several characters of interaction, which fall, roughly speaking, into four 
categories:!
• Competition:!for!regulatory!“turf,”!financing,!reputation,!legitimacy,!adherents!or!other!benefits.!!Schemes!may!compete!on!price!(e.g.,!certification!costs),!product!differentiation!(e.g.,!more!or!less!stringent!requirements),!or!other!bases.!!Competition!may!also!be!nonWmarket,!e.g.,!for!authority!to!define!key!terms!and!practices.!!
• Coordination:!ranging!from!emulation!and!mimesis,!to!deliberate!collaboration,!to!conscious!division!of!labor.!!Coordination!occurs,!among!other!reasons,!as!TBG!schemes!strive!for!legitimacy!and!policy!relevance,!learn!from!one!another,!and!copy!proven!“recipes!for!success.”!!
• Cooptation:!ranging!from!friendly!convergence!on!norms!and!activities,!to!metaWregulation,!to!hegemony!or!dominance,!with!certain!initiatives!achieving!a!quasiWmonopolistic!position!(e.g.,!Büthe!2010b).!!
• Chaos:!unpredictable,!undirected!interactions,!sensitive!to!slight!perturbations!and!displaying!no!clear!pattern.!!
More than one of these may characterize interactions in a given TBG domain. Interactions 
between the same actors and institutions may, for example, exhibit competition and cooperation 
simultaneously (e.g. Koppell 2010). Moreover, there may be dynamic transitions between 
categories, for example with initial chaos developing into competition as schemes vie for 
adherents, then coordination as they converge on standard regulatory recipes, and cooptation as 
one scheme corners the regulatory marketplace. Equally, coordination might devolve into 
competition or chaos. 
! 
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In the case of competition, analysis centres on which strategies are used to gain dominance in 
the struggle: for example, appeals to the profit motives of target firms or to broader audiences via 
norms and legitimation (e.g., Bernstein & Cashore 2007; Gulbrandsen 2010).  In the case of 
coordination, it is important to note that interactions, and information about them, can both be 
asymmetric.  For example, it is doubtful that the ILO or ISO has a record of every regulatory 
scheme that references its standards.  Coordination may also be direct or indirect. Indirect 
coordination includes common cognitive framing of a problem or a set of shared goals. Direct 
coordination may take place through hierarchy, network or peer-to-peer interaction.   
Of these, hierarchy is surprisingly common.  Where organizations are “nested” (Aggarwal 
1998), coherence is relatively easy to achieve, as the hierarchically superior regime can resolve 
conflicts.  For example, in food safety, the Codex Alimentarius Commission is the dominant 
standards body; local standard-setters must formulate standards within the framework it has set.  
Alternatively, or in addition, hierarchical interactions may be based on divisions of labor:  one 
scheme may enroll another to perform certain regulatory functions, as FSC and MSC enroll 
Accreditation Services International (ASI) to manage certification and chain of custody 
processes.  Hierarchies may be based on formally agreed power arrangements, or may arise from 
legal authority (e.g., the significance of the WTO rules for voluntary standards).  Hierarchy may 
of course be combined with networked or peer-to-peer interactions.  For example, standard-
setting TBG schemes may be in a hierarchical relationship with a shared third-party certification 
organization but in a peer-to-peer relationship with one another.   
Different modes of interaction may arise at different institutional levels.  For example, even 
if two TBG standard-setting schemes in the same domain do not actively compete, their local 
units may compete fiercely over local businesses, as they seek to expand their regulatory share.  
This can have a significant effect on interaction dynamics at higher levels. 
“Carving out” is another mode of coordination, in which one scheme deliberately shapes 
itself around others to fill a perceived gap.  This interaction is asymmetric, rather than mutual or 
hierarchical, and need not be managed by a “meta” orchestrator.  Such interactions appear quite 
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common, as each new scheme carves out a distinctive regulatory domain amidst existing state 
and non-state schemes (Wood 2003, 2005).  
Interactions may also take the form of cooptation: one scheme adopts the rules of another 
through referencing or certification, as discussed above.  For example, ASI coopts the ISO 
accreditation regime by maintaining its practices in line with ISO 17011 standards for 
accreditation bodies.  Widespread cooptation can produce de facto domination, as the widespread 
adoption of ISO accreditation and auditing standards by other standards-setting bodies illustrates.  
Domination may also be more deliberate, with a particular scheme maneuvering itself into 
recognition by an international body, as the Codex Alimentarius Commission has done (Büthe 
2009).  
Finally, interactions can simply be chaotic.  In a particular domain, schemes may overlap, 
each claiming authority and intersecting with others on multiple issues, producing not only 
confusion but “substantial impacts on each other in the process” (Young 1996: 6).  Whether such 
chaos evolves into another mode likely depends on whether the relevant organizations work at 
cross-purposes or pursue similar goals, whether their rules are compatible, and whether they 
perform complementary functions.  As a mode of interaction, however, chaos cannot be 
discounted. 
3.5.)What)are)the)effects)of)interactions?)
Scholars have employed various analytical frameworks to study the effects of TBGI.  As 
discussed above, several studies focus on whether competitive interactions lead to a “race to the 
bottom” or “race to the top”, in terms of the stringency of standards (e.g., Cashore et al. 2004; 
Overdevest 2004; Smith & Fischlein 2010; Bartley 2007b). Others emphasize homogenization, 
standardization and isomorphism, focusing more on whether and why significant differences 
persist between schemes than on social impacts (e.g., Dingwerth & Pattberg 2009; Bartley 
2011a).  The familiar division between outputs, outcomes and impacts is a useful starting point 
for analysis (Underdal 2004). While impacts on social or environmental conditions are of course 
the ultimate concern, they are very difficult to isolate and quantify due to the number of variables 
in play and the multiplicity and complexity of causal chains. More immediate effects are more 
tractable, but highly diverse.  Analysis might focus, for example, on the regulatory outputs of 
! 
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interaction, such as institutional features of TBG schemes, or norms and their uptake by targets; 
or it might investigate regulatory outcomes (changes in target behavior).  
Moving beyond the output-outcome-impact cascade, we suggest asking an intermediate 
question: what are the effects of interactions on regulatory capacity and performance?  Capacity 
and performance are enhanced by harnessing the diverse motivations, competencies and 
resources of the actors seeking to participate in or control a regulatory space. Analysts might ask, 
then, how successful is the process of enrolling, mobilizing or orchestrating the actors whose 
contributions are essential to achieving regulatory goals? This can be asked both of TBG 
schemes and of the larger regulatory complex.  While early regime complexity scholarship 
focused on the negative consequences of institutional overlap for regulatory effectiveness, more 
recent studies focus on relationships beyond overlap and point to potentially productive 
interactions.  For example, interactions may promote innovation and experimentation, as well as 
local adaptability and flexibility (Keohane & Victor 2011; Sabel & Zeitlin 2008; Overdevest & 
Zeitlin, this issue).  The regime interplay literature (Oberthür & Gehring 2011) emphasizes that 
“synergy” is at least as common as “conflict”, at least in the environmental field.   
For TBG schemes, inconsistency with state-based rules may occur, but is typically resolved 
through legal hierarchy. TBG schemes may compete, but synergies among them may increase 
over time, as they increase actor choice, complement public standards and address problems in 
diverse ways (Abbott 2012). The existence of multiple TBG schemes may serve to recruit 
additional constituencies to address a given problem, produce greater overall regulatory capacity, 
or prompt greater uptake of norms by producers, retailers and other actors.  Interaction among 
TBG schemes within a particular domain may also lead to common cognitive framings of 
problems and goals, norms and ways of acting, as well as discourses that broaden engagement 
and facilitate further interactions.  On the other hand, multiplicity may dilute regulatory capacity 
and performance as schemes work at cross-purposes and targets seek out the least demanding 
rules.  Simply put, the effects of interaction will vary with the empirical context.  
#
#
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#
3.6.#Development#over#time##
Finally, interactions are fluid and dynamic; a snapshot of interactions frozen at a moment in 
time has little analytical value. Over time, interaction may lead TBG schemes to converge or 
diverge in institutional design, membership, standards or other parameters. It may diffuse ideas 
and practices from one place or sector to others, spurring processes of mutual adaptation and 
learning. It may result in concentration or fragmentation of regulatory markets, proliferation or 
withering away of TBG schemes. Standards may become more stringent or lax; enforcement 
may become more formal and legalistic, or less.  Given the multiplicity of actors, levels, and 
mechanisms of interaction, there are good reasons to expect TBG – and the wider regulatory 
complexes it helps constitute – to be characterized by unintended consequences, tipping points 
and emergent properties.  An account of TBG interactions should address such temporal 
dynamics across all dimensions of regulatory governance. 
For example, a domain may initially be characterized by one or a few unstable, weakly 
institutionalized schemes.  Many start as small groups of interested individuals, and then move to 
formal organization.  As the FSC illustrates, a TBG scheme may gradually become more widely 
adopted within its domain.  Its success may lead to it becoming a model for other schemes in the 
same or other domains. MSC, for example, imitated FSC’s organizational structure, standards 
model, labeling and certification, and even its accreditation body, ASI, leading to more 
numerous interactions with other schemes.  A meta-organization such as the ISEAL Alliance 
may then bring together now-stable schemes as models, institutionalizing that model and 
bringing further stabilization, and further interactions.    
However, the nature of these temporal processes must be probed.  For example, the theory of 
punctuated equilibrium (Hall 1993) may not pertain.  Moreover, there may be different patterns 
of change across particular dimensions of regulatory governance.  Disaggregating interactions 
into components of the regulatory process, as proposed here, makes it easier to see whether, for 
example, apparent stability at the level of stated goals in fact masks paradigmatic changes at the 
level of implementation (Howlett & Cashore 2009; Black et al 2005).  Individual theoretical 
perspectives may not capture the full range of shifts in constellations of organizations and their 
cognitive, normative or communicative structures, such as the recharacterization of problems and 
solutions (e.g., re-conceptualizing plant genetic rights from common heritage to private property, 
! 
26!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!OSGOODE!CLPE!RESEARCH!PAPER!SERIES!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!![VOL.!08!NO.06]!
Raustiala & Victor 2004).  Hence it is all the more important to draw on a number of theoretical 
perspectives, as exemplified in this special issue.  
 
4.))Conclusion)
This article has demonstrated the value of studying TBG interactions and their effects. As we 
have clearly indicated, this is a highly complex issue.  We have therefore proposed an analytical 
framework that can be used by scholars in a variety of theoretical traditions to gain purchase on 
this difficult topic. Our framework is rooted in a regulatory governance perspective that views 
TBG as a dynamic, co-regulatory and co-evolutionary process, involving state, non-state and 
hybrid actors and organizations that pursue varied interests and seek “regulatory share” (Black 
2009), have different regulatory capacities, and interact at multiple levels and in multiple ways, 
with a range of effects.  What makes our framework distinctive is its focus on the regulatory 
governance process.  The framework (Table 1) is based on disaggregating this process and 
focusing on the points in the process at which interactions may occur.  At each point, we suggest 
a series of analytical questions that highlight the key features of TBG interactions: who or what 
is interacting; what drives and shapes interactions; what are the mechanisms and pathways of 
interaction; what is the character of interaction; what are the effects of interaction; and how does 
interaction change over time?   
While the ultimate goal remains to assess the impacts of interactions on the attainment of 
societal ends, we suggest a more modest initial focus on effects on regulatory capacity and 
performance.  Can we isolate the effects of interactions on regulatory capacity, and on the 
performance of the regulatory system? The conditions for effective capacity and performance 
include some degree of shared interests, goals, and understandings; enrolment and orchestration 
of needed resources; mechanisms to promote compliance; and the like.  In this respect, we can 
draw on existing work on TBG schemes, the literature on responses to international norms and 
the regulatory governance literature for insights. Yet such an approach still faces major 
conceptual and methodological challenges, including which concepts and indicators of capacity 
and performance are useful to guide empirical analysis.  The analytical framework we propose is 
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thus only a first step in addressing these difficult questions; but it is an important one 
nonetheless.   
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